We investigate the association betw

We investigate the association between managerial overconfidence and audit fees, as well
as the effect of a strong audit committee on this relation. Overconfident managers tend to
overestimate their ability and the future payouts of projects but underestimate the likelihood
and impact of adverse events. If auditors perceive managerial overconfidence as
increasing audit risk, they will charge additional fees to compensate for the increased audit
effort. Conversely, audit fees for companies with an overconfident manager will be lower
if managers demand less audit services due to either hubris in their companies’ financial
reporting or a desire to reduce auditor scrutiny over aggressive accounting practices. We
find evidence of a negative relation between managerial overconfidence and audit fees for
companies lacking a strong audit committee. Additionally, we find that overconfident managers
are less likely to use an industry specialist auditor.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 2:

We Investigate the association between managerial overconfidence and Audit fees, as well
as the Effect of a strong Audit Committee on this relation. Overconfident Managers tend to
overestimate their ability and the Future Payouts but underestimate the likelihood of Projects
and Impact of adverse events. If Auditors perceive as managerial overconfidence
Audit increasing risk, they charge additional fees to compensate for the Will Increased Audit
effort. Conversely, Audit fees for companies with an Overconfident Manager Will be Lower
demand if less Audit Services Managers Due to either Hubris in their companies' Financial
Reporting Auditor or a Desire to Reduce Scrutiny over aggressive accounting Practices. We
Find Evidence of a negative relation between managerial overconfidence and Audit fees for
companies lacking a strong Audit Committee. Additionally, we Find that Overconfident Managers
are less likely to use an Industry Specialist Auditor.