. Results6.1. GAAP ETR The results

. Results
6.1. GAAP ETR
The results of estimating Eq. (1) where the GAAP ETR is the dependent variable are presented in Table 3. We first
consider the role of the level of compensation, which is presented in columns (1) and (2). In the first model, where all of
the positions are simultaneously considered, we find a strong negative relationship between tax director compensation
and the GAAP ETR, but no significant relationship with the other three executives. This strong negative relationship
continues to hold when we estimate the model considering only the tax executive.26
When we measure incentives as compensation mix in columns (3) and (4), we again find a strong negative relationship
between tax director incentives and the GAAP ETR when all executives are considered together. We continue to find a
negative relationship when only the tax director’s incentives are included in the analysis (i.e. column 4). Overall, the
evidence presented in Table 3 provides strong support for the notion that tax directors, but not the CEO, general counsel,
and CFO have incentives to manage the GAAP ETR.
We also find a significant relationship between the GAAP ETR and certain control variables included in the specification.
In particular, Return on Assets is significantly positive which indicates that more profitable firms have higher GAAP ETRs.
Our proxy for the operating risk, Std. Dev. ROA, is negative and significant, consistent with convexity in the tax function
(i.e., losses can reduce future earnings). Foreign Assets is positive and is generally significant, suggesting that firms with
greater multinational activities have higher GAAP ETRs. Although we expected foreign activity to give rise to lower tax
liabilities, our results are consistent with foreign investment being correlated with future profitability. Geographical
Complexity is positive and significant, suggesting that firms with more dispersed geographic operations have lower
effective tax rates. Consistent with Mills et al. (1998), we also we find that a higher Proportion Tax Fees is associated
relatively lower GAAP ETRs, which suggests the presence of more sophisticated tax planning.
Interestingly, these results suggest that tax directors are compensated on the basis of after-tax financial reporting
measures rather than pre-tax measures. In particular, since we find no association between taxable income and tax director
incentives, the negative relationship with the GAAP ETR is consistent with tax directors’ undertaking of tax planning
involving permanent differences and ETR differentials. Thus, our results corroborate Robinson et al.’s (2010) finding that
firms provide incentives to the tax department to mitigate the impact of taxes on bottom-line net income.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 2:

. Results
6.1. GAAP ETR
Estimating The results of Eq. (1) Where is The GAAP ETR are Presented in Table 3. The dependent Variable fi RST We
consider The role of The Level of compensation, which is Presented in columns (1) and (2). The fi in RST Model, Where all of
The Positions are considered Simultaneously, we fi ND a strong Negative Relationship between Tax director compensation
and The GAAP ETR, but no signi fi Cant Relationship with The Other Three executives. This strong Negative Relationship
Continues to Hold When we Estimate The Model considering only Executive.26 The Tax
Incentives As compensation Mix When we measure in columns (3) and (4), we fi ND Again a strong Negative Relationship
between Tax Incentives and The director GAAP. ETR when all executives are considered together. We Continue to fi ND a
Negative Relationship When only The Tax Incentives are Included in The director's analysis (IE column 4). Overall, The
Evidence Presented in Table 3 provides strong support for The notion that Tax Directors, but Not The CEO, general Counsel,
and CFO Have Incentives to Manage The GAAP ETR.
We also fi ND a signi fi Cant Relationship between The GAAP ETR and Certain Control variables. The speci fi cation Included in.
In particular, Return on Assets is signi fi cantly more positive which indicates that Pro fi fi RMS Table ETRS Have Higher GAAP.
Our Proxy for The operating risk, Std. Dev. ROA, is Negative and signi fi Cant, consistent with convexity in The Tax function
(IE, Can Reduce Future earnings losses). Foreign Assets is positive and is generally signi fi Cant, suggesting that fi RMS with
greater Multinational activities ETRS Have Higher GAAP. Although we expected Foreign Activity to Give Rise to Lower Tax
liabilities, our results are consistent with being correlated with Foreign Investment Future Pro fi Tability. Geographical
Complexity is positive and signi fi Cant, suggesting that fi RMS with more dispersed Geographic Operations Have Lower
Effective Tax Rates. Consistent with Mills et al. (One thousand nine hundred ninety-eight), we also we fi ND that a Higher Proportion Tax Fees is Associated
relatively Lower GAAP ETRS, which Suggests The Presence of more Sophisticated Tax planning.
Interestingly, these results Suggest that Tax Directors are compensated on The BASIS of After-Tax fi Nancial Reporting.
measures rather than pre-tax measures. In particular, since we fi ND Taxable income no association between director and Tax
Incentives, The Negative Relationship with The GAAP ETR is consistent with Tax Directors' undertaking of Tax planning
involving Permanent Differences and ETR differentials. Thus, our results corroborate Robinson et AL.'s (The 2,010th) fi Nding that
provide fi RMS Incentives to The Tax Department to mitigate The bottom-Line Impact of taxes on net income.