AbstractIn response to the demands

Abstract

In response to the demands of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and consequent accounting regulations regarding internal controls, some organizations engage the assistance of external consultants in compliance efforts. We experimentally investigate how the involvement of such an external consultant affects external auditors’ planning decisions under varying conditions of client credibility. We find that, as expected, auditors increase their reliance on client’s internal control and reduce planned audit effort when a client uses a consultant, but only when the client has questionable credibility. Surprisingly, auditors increase budgeted hours when a highly credible client engages external consultants. We perform supplementary analyses and offer potential explanations for this unexpected result.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 2:

Abstract In Response to Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the demands of consequent accounting regulations regarding internal Controls, Some organizations Engage the Assistance of external Consultants in compliance efforts. We experimentally investigate how the involvement of such an external consultant affects external auditors' planning decisions under varying conditions of client credibility. We find that, as expected, auditors increase their reliance on client's internal control and reduce planned audit effort when a client uses a consultant, but only when the client has questionable credibility. Surprisingly, auditors increase budgeted hours when a highly credible client engages external consultants. We perform supplementary analyses and offer potential explanations for this unexpected result.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 3:

Abstract

In response to the demands of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and consequent accounting regulations regarding, internal controls. Some organizations engage the assistance of external consultants in compliance efforts. We experimentally investigate how. The involvement of such an external consultant affects external auditors' planning decisions under varying conditions of. Client credibility.We that find, expected as, increase auditors their reliance on client 's internal control and reduce planned audit effort. When a client uses a consultant but only, when the client has questionable credibility. Surprisingly auditors increase,, Budgeted hours when a highly credible client engages external consultants.We perform supplementary analyses and offer potential explanations for this unexpected result.