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of those offered SAFI with timing choice accepted it, and 44 percent of those offered it choseearly delivery.The model implies that of those choosing late delivery would end upactually buying fertilizer. In reality, 39 percent did. This again suggests that the model doesreasonably well in matching statistics that were not used to calibrate it.Similarly, since the model predicts that the only farmers who will request early deliverywill be the stochastically hyperbolic farmers who prefer committing immediately to saving,we would expect that a proportion of farmers requesting early delivery willeventually purchase. This is very close to the actual percentage of 46 percent.The model does a bit less well predicting the adoption impact of the SAFI with ex antetiming choice. We would predict that would end up usingfertilizer in this variant (less than the basic SAFI), whereas in reality 47 percent did (morethan the basic SAFI). Although 38 percent lies in the confidence interval of our pointestimate, it is further from our calibrated estimate than the other figures.Finally, one other check on the plausibility of the estimation is whether it impliesimplausibly low discount rate of impatient farmers, . The condition for an impatient farmerto not use fertilizer is . Since the mean rate of return to fertilizer is 36 percent(Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2008), this implies that for close to 0, . Thisestimate is similar to an estimate from Laibson, et al. (2007), who estimate a around 0.7.6.2 Laissez Faire, Heavy Subsidies, or Nudges?The calibrated model can be used to provide a rough comparison of the welfare impacts oflaissez fair, heavy subsidies, and small nudges (this is similar in spirit to the exercise carriedout in Similar to the approach in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), to evaluate optimal taxeswhen a fraction of agents are not fully rational). For this calculation, we assume that f is small(effectively zero). We assume that the marginal cost of government funds is 20 percent15 andconsider a two-thirds subsidy similar to that adopted in Malawi. We also use estimates fromthe experiments described in Duflo, et al. (2008), which imply that the incremental return to a