ฉันรักการแปล3.7.2 Conceptual thinki

ฉันรักการแปล3.7.2 Conceptual thinking

But if our sensible representations would, in themselves, present a simple, partless, Parmenidean object beyond time and space, how is it that they in fact seem to represent distinct things in our awareness? At first glance Herbart would seem to be presenting the Kantian picture of a chaotic sensible manifold, upon which a spontaneous Understanding could work its synthetic operations. But in keeping with his anti-faculty position, Herbart argues instead for a kind of “passive synthesis” avant la lettre (SW VI: 116), by which certain representations are connected and collected into separate unities, but spontaneously, motivated solely from within, in accordance with the laws of psycho-mechanics and psycho-statics (cf. esp. SW VI: 114, ff.).

Herbart proceeds by giving a “naturalized”[57] account of concept formation, that is, of representation-masses that, over time, develop into instruments by which we become conscious of things, and ultimately of ourselves. Thus, while there is “no doubt that just as concepts arise out of sense-perceptions [Wahrnehmungen], so, too, do clear concepts arise out of unclear[58] concepts”—nevertheless, these processes must be explained without recourse to a deus ex machina one calls “the Understanding” (SW VI: 117).

Anticipating the battles over logical psychologism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Herbart carefully distinguishes between a psychological and a logical sense of “concept” (SW VI: 119–20; cf. Stout 1888b: 477; van der Schaar 2013: 83). He writes:

Every thought [cōgitātum], considered merely according to its quality [sc. quā cōgitātum], is a concept in the logical sense. (SW VI: 119)

By “concept in the logical sense”, he means the represented

content considered apart from the psychological conditions and circumstances of its presentation at this or that time to this or that individual mind. (Stout 1888b: 477)

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 1:

I would love to translate the Conceptual thinking 3.7.2.But if our sensible representations would, in themselves, present a simple, partless, Parmenidean object beyond time and space, how is it that they in fact seem to represent distinct things in our awareness? At first glance Herbart would seem to be presenting the Kantian picture of a chaotic sensible manifold, upon which a spontaneous Understanding could work its synthetic operations. But in keeping with his anti-faculty position, Herbart argues instead for a kind of "passive synthesis" avant la lettre (SW VI: 116), by which certain representations are connected and collected into separate unities, but spontaneously, motivated solely from within, in accordance with the laws of psycho-mechanics and psycho-statics (cf. esp. SW VI: 114, ff.).Herbart proceeds by giving a "naturalized"[57] account of concept formation, that is, of representation-masses that, over time, develop into instruments by which we become conscious of things, and ultimately of ourselves. Thus, while there is "no doubt that just as concepts arise out of sense-perceptions [Wahrnehmungen], so, too, do clear concepts arise out of unclear[58] concepts"—nevertheless, these processes must be explained without recourse to a deus ex machina one calls "the Understanding" (SW VI: 117).Anticipating the battles over logical psychologism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Herbart carefully distinguishes between a psychological and a logical sense of “concept” (SW VI: 119–20; cf. Stout 1888b: 477; van der Schaar 2013: 83). He writes:Every thought [cōgitātum], considered merely according to its quality [sc. quā cōgitātum], is a concept in the logical sense. (SW VI: 119)By “concept in the logical sense”, he means the representedcontent considered apart from the psychological conditions and circumstances of its presentation at this or that time to this or that individual mind. (Stout 1888b: 477)

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 2:

I love to translate 3.7.2 Conceptual thinking Sensible But if our representations would, in themselves, present a Simple, Partless, Parmenidean Object Beyond Space and time, How is it that they seem to represent in Fact Distinct Things in our awareness? At First. glance Herbart would seem to be presenting the Kantian picture of a chaotic sensible manifold, upon which a spontaneous Understanding could work its synthetic operations. But in keeping with his anti-faculty position, Herbart argues instead for a kind of "passive synthesis" avant la. lettre (SW VI: 116), by which certain representations are connected and collected into separate unities, but spontaneously, motivated solely from within, in accordance with the laws of psycho-mechanics and psycho-statics (cf. esp. SW VI: 114. , FF.). Herbart proceeds by giving a "naturalized" [57] Account of Concept Formation, that is, of representation-masses that, over time, develop Into Instruments by which we Become Conscious of Things, and Ultimately of Ourselves. Thus. , while there is "no doubt that just as concepts arise out of sense-perceptions [Wahrnehmungen], so, too, do clear concepts arise out of unclear [58] concepts" -nevertheless, these processes must be explained without recourse to a deus. ex Machina one calls "the Understanding" (SW VI: 117). Anticipating the battles over the Late 19th and Early logical Psychologism of 20th centuries, Herbart carefully distinguishes between a logical and a Psychological Sense of "Concept" (SW VI: 119. 20; cf. Stout 1888b: 477; Van der Schaar the 2,013th: 83). He writes: Every thought [Cōgitātum], considered merely according to its quality [SC. qua Cōgitātum], is a logical Concept in the Sense. (SW VI. : 119) By "Concept in the logical Sense", He means the represented content considered Apart from the Psychological conditions and circumstances of its Presentation at this or that time to this or that individual Mind. (Stout 1888b: 477).