toward their customers. Reasons inc

toward their customers. Reasons include higher cost of operation (since SAV burns some energy and
requires extra training and monitoring), but the big reason why SAV isn’t the default is: SAV benefits
only other people’s customers, not an operator’s own customers.
There is no way to audit a network from outside to determine if it practices SAV. Any kind of
compliance testing for SAV has to be done by a device that’s inside the network whose compliance
is in question. That means the same network operator who has no incentive in the first place to
deploy SAV at all is the only party who can tell whether SAV is deployed. This does not bode well
for a general improvement in SAV conditions, even if bolstered by law or treaty. It could become
an insurance and audit requirement in countries where insurance and auditing are common, but
as long as most of the world has no reason to care about SAV, it’s safe to assume that enough of the
Internet’s edge will always permit packet-level source-address forgery, so that we had better start
learning how to live with it—for all eternity.
While there are some interesting problems in data poisoning made possible by the lack of SAV, by
far the most dangerous thing about packet forgery is the way it facilitates DDoS (distributed denial
of service).2 If anybody can emit a packet claiming to be from anybody else, then a modest stream of
requests by an attacker, forged to appear to have come from the victim, directed at publicly reachable
and massively powerful Internet servers, will cause that victim to drown in responses to requests
they never made. Worse, the victim can’t trace the attack back to where it entered the network and
has no recourse other than to wait for the attack to end, or hire a powerful network-security vendor
to absorb the attack so that the victim’s other services remain reachable during the attack.3
DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM RESPONSE RATE LIMITING
During a wave of attacks a few years ago where massively powerful public DNS (Domain Name
System) servers were being used to reflect and amplify some very potent DDoS attacks, Internet
researchers Paul Vixie and Vernon Schryver developed a system called DNS RRL (Response Rate
Limiting) that allowed the operators of the DNS servers being used for these reflected amplified
attacks to deliberately drop the subset of their input request flow that was statistically likely to
be attack-related.4 DNS RRL is not a perfect solution, since it can cause slight delays in a minority
of normal (non-attack) transactions during attack conditions. The DNS RRL tradeoff, however, is
obviously considered a positive since all modern DNS servers and even a few IPS/IDS (intrusion
protection system/intrusion detection system) products now have some form of DNS RRL, and many
TLD (top-level domain) DNS servers are running DNS RRL. Operators of powerful Internet servers
must all learn and follow Stan Lee’s law (as voiced by Spider-Man): “With great power comes great
responsibility.”
DNS RRL was a domain-specific solution, relying on detailed knowledge of DNS itself. For
example, the reason DNS RRL is response rate limiting is that the mere fact of a question’s arrival does
not tell the rate limiter enough to make a decision as to whether that request is or is not likely to be
part of an attack. Given also a prospective response, though, it is possible with high confidence to
detect spoofed-source questions and thereby reduce the utility of the DNS server as a reflecting DDoS
amplifier, while still providing “good enough” service to non-attack traffic occurring at the same
time—even if that non-attack traffic is very similar to the attack.
The economics of information warfare is no different from any other kind of warfare—one seeks
to defend at a lower cost than the attacker, and to attack at a lower cost than the defender. DNS RRL

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 2:

toward their customers. Reasons include higher cost of Operation (since SAV Burns Some Energy and
requires extra Training and Monitoring), but the Big Reason why SAV is not the default is: SAV Benefits
only Other people's customers, not an operator's own customers.
There is no Way. to audit a network from outside to determine if it practices SAV. Any Kind of
compliance Testing has to be done by a SAV for that Device's Inside the Network whose compliance
is in question. Network operator means that the Same Who has no incentive in the First Place to
Deploy SAV at all is the only party Who Can tell whether SAV is deployed. This does not Bode well
for a general SAV Improvement in conditions, or even if bolstered by Law Treaty. It could Become
an Insurance and Audit requirement in countries where Insurance and auditing are common, but
as long as Most of the World has no Reason to Care About SAV, it's Safe to assume that Enough of the
internet's EDGE Will always Permit packet-level Source. -address forgery, so that we had better Start
Learning How to Live with it-for all Eternity.
While there are Some Interesting Problems in Data poisoning Made possible by the Lack of SAV, by
Far the Most Dangerous Thing About packet forgery is the Way. Facilitates it DDoS (Distributed denial
of Service) .2 If Anybody Can Emit a packet claiming to be from Anybody Else, then a Modest Stream of
requests by an Attacker, Forged to appear to have Come from the Victim, directed at publicly Reachable
and Massively. powerful internet Servers, Will Cause that Victim to Drown in Responses to requests
they Never Made. Worse, the Victim Can not Trace the Attack Back to where it entered the Network and
has no recourse Other than to wait for the Attack to End, or Hire a powerful Network-Security vendor
to absorb the Attack so that the Victim's Other Services remain. Reachable during the Attack.3
DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM RESPONSE RATE limiting
During a Wave of attacks a few years ago where Massively powerful Public DNS (Domain Name
System) Servers were being used to amplify and Reflect Some very potent DDoS attacks, internet
Paul Vixie and researchers. vernon Schryver developed a System Called DNS RRL (first to rate Response
Limiting) that allowed the operators of the DNS Servers being used for amplified reflected these
attacks to the Subset of their input Deliberately Drop Request flow that was statistically likely to
be Related.4 Attack-DNS. RRL is not a Perfect Solution, since it Can Cause slight delays in a Minority
of Normal (non-Attack) Attack conditions during transactions. The DNS RRL tradeoff, however, is
obviously considered a positive since all Modern DNS Servers and even a few IPS / IDS (intrusion
Protection System / intrusion detection System) Products now have Some form of DNS RRL, and many
TLD (top-level domain. ) DNS servers are running DNS RRL. Operators of powerful internet Servers
must all follow Stan Lee's Learn and Law (Voiced by Spider-Man as): "With Great Power comes Great
Responsibility. "
RRL was a DNS domain-specific Solution, Relying on detailed Knowledge of DNS Itself. For
example, the DNS RRL Reason is that the response rate limiting is a question of Fact Mere's arrival does
not tell the rate limiter Enough to Make a decision as to whether that is or is not likely to be Request
Part of an Attack. Given also a prospective response, though, it is possible with High confidence to
detect spoofed-Source questions and thereby Reduce the Utility of the DNS Server as a Reflecting DDoS
Amplifier, while still providing "good Enough" Service to non-Attack Traffic occurring at. the Same
time-even if that non-Attack Traffic is very similar to the Attack.
The economics of information warfare is no different from any Other Kind of warfare-one seeks
to Defend at a Lower cost than the Attacker, and to Attack at a. lower cost than the defender. DNS RRL

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 3:

Toward their customers. Reasons include higher cost of operation (since SAV burns some energy and
requires extra training. And monitoring), but the big reason why SAV isn 't the default is: SAV benefits
only other people', s customers not an operator s. ' Own customers.
There is no way to audit a network from outside to determine if it practices SAV. Any kind of
.Compliance testing for SAV has to be done by a device that 's inside the network whose compliance
is in question. That means. The same network operator who has no incentive in the first place to
deploy SAV at all is the only party who can tell whether. SAV is deployed. This does not bode well
for a general improvement in, SAV conditions even if bolstered by law or, treaty. It could become
.An insurance and audit requirement in countries where insurance and auditing, are common but
as long as most of the world. Has no reason to care about SAV it ', s safe to assume that enough of the
Internet' s edge will always permit packet-level. Source-address forgery so that, we had better start
learning how to live with it - for all eternity.
.While there are some interesting problems in data poisoning made possible by the lack, of SAV by
far the most dangerous. Thing about packet forgery is the way it facilitates DDoS (distributed denial
of service). 2 If anybody can emit a packet. Claiming to be from, anybody else then a modest stream of
requests by an attacker forged to, appear to have come from the. Victim.Directed at publicly reachable
and massively powerful Internet servers will cause, that victim to drown in responses to. Requests
they never made. Worse the victim, can 't trace the attack back to where it entered the network and
has no recourse. Other than to wait for the attack to end or hire, a powerful network-security vendor
.To absorb the attack so that the victim 's other services remain reachable during the attack.3
DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM RESPONSE. RATE LIMITING
During a wave of attacks a few years ago where massively powerful public DNS (Domain Name
System servers.) Were being used to reflect and amplify some very potent, DDoS attacks Internet
.Researchers Paul Vixie and Vernon Schryver developed a system called DNS RRL (Response Rate
Limiting) that allowed the. Operators of the DNS servers being used for these reflected amplified
attacks to deliberately drop the subset of their input. Request flow that was statistically likely to
be attack-related.4 DNS RRL is not a perfect solution since it, can cause. Slight delays in a minority
.Of normal (non-attack) transactions during attack conditions. The DNS, RRL tradeoff however is
obviously, considered a. Positive since all modern DNS servers and even a few IPS / IDS (intrusion
protection system / intrusion detection system products.) Now have some form of, DNS RRL and many
TLD (top-level domain) DNS servers are running DNS RRL. Operators of powerful Internet. Servers
.Must all learn and follow Stan Lee 's law (as voiced by Spider-Man): "With great power comes great

, DNS responsibility." RRL was a domain-specific solution relying on, detailed knowledge of DNS itself. For
example the reason, DNS RRL is response. Rate limiting is that the mere fact of a question 's arrival does
.Not tell the rate limiter enough to make a decision as to whether that request is or is not likely to be
part of an, attack. Given also a, prospective response though it is, possible with high confidence to
detect spoofed-source questions and thereby. Reduce the utility of the DNS server as a reflecting, DDoS
amplifierWhile still providing "good enough." service to non-attack traffic occurring at the same
time - even if that non-attack traffic. Is very similar to the attack.
The economics of information warfare is no different from any other kind of warfare - one seeks
to. Defend at a lower cost than the attacker and to, attack at a lower cost than the defender. DNS RRL.