formerly represented by groups. Whe

formerly represented by groups. When the audit does not yield satisfactory results, it is rarely the audit itself that is called into ques- tion, but instead the skills of the auditors. The whole of society is affected: political parties, agencies, schools, and associations.
Indicators of performance are great policy instruments for government because they can change the indicators relatively easily. On the basis of the British case, even constant modi- fication of instruments can be seen as signifi- cant, in that this obliges the actors to adapt all the time, ‘running along behind’ instruments that are constantly changing in the name of efficiency and rationality. This instrumental- ization of the instrumentation considerably increases the degree of control by central élites and marginalizes the issue of aims and objectives even further – or at the very least, euphemizes them. From this angle, public policy instruments may be seen as revealing the behaviours of actors, with the actors becom- ing more visible and more predictable through the workings of instruments (an essential factor from the point of view of the state’s élites).
Policy instruments are not neutral; they condense some form of political power and technique. They have effect of their own but, as for other types of institutions, creative use by various actors produce unintended effects. The instrumentation process reveals political logic and some characteristics of modes of governance. At times, it may be quite central to understand this dimension and one can argue that modes of governance can be trans- formed by technical instruments and their use. The focus on policy instruments and the activities within governance is not the whole story to understand modes of governance but it’s a fruitful way to analyse some of it and the implicit power dimension, beyond the goals and the discourses.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This chapter owes much to the Policy Instruments and Instrumentation project that
I have run at Sciences Po with Pierre Lascoumes and now Charlotte Halpern. Some of the developments are directly taken from working notes and papers written with Pierre Lascoumes, whom I also thank for his precise analysis of Foucault. I thank Mark Bevir for incisive and constructive comments on the first draft of this chapter.
NOTE
1 This section develops arguments made by Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004, 2007) and Halpern and Le Galès, 2008).
REFERENCES
Bertelmans-Videc, M.L, Rist, R.C. and Vedung, E. (1998) Carrots, Sticks and Sermons, Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation. New Brunswick, Canada: Transaction Books.
Bevir M. (2005) New Labour, A critique: London, Routledge.
Bezes, P. (2007) ‘Cutting Public Service Wages with a Low-Profile Instrument: A Technical and Genealogical View of the French Policy of Economic Stringency’, Governance 20(1).
Callon, M. and Latour, B. (1981) ‘Unscrewing the Big Leviathan; or How Actors Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them To Do So?’, in A. Cicourel (ed.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro and Macro-Sociologies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Commission of the European Communities (2001) European Governance. a White paper, COM 428. Dahl R. and Lindblom C. (1953) Politics, Economics and
Welfare. New York: Harper & row.
Dehousse, R. (2004) La Méthode Ouverte de Coor-
dination, Quand l’Instrument Tient Lieu de Politique’, in P. Lascoumes and P. Le Galès (eds), Gouverner par les Instruments. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Faucher-King, F. and Le Galès, P. (2010) The New Labour Experiment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Favre, Pierre (2005) Comprendre le Monde pour le Changer, Épistémologie du Fait Politique. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 1:

formerly represented by groups. When the audit does not yield satisfactory results, it is rarely the audit itself that is called into ques- tion, but instead the skills of the auditors. The whole of society is affected: political parties, agencies, schools, and associations.Indicators of performance are great policy instruments for government because they can change the indicators relatively easily. On the basis of the British case, even constant modi- fication of instruments can be seen as signifi- cant, in that this obliges the actors to adapt all the time, 'running along behind' instruments that are constantly changing in the name of efficiency and rationality. This instrumental- ization of the instrumentation considerably increases the degree of control by central élites and marginalizes the issue of aims and objectives even further – or at the very least, euphemizes them. From this angle, public policy instruments may be seen as revealing the behaviours of actors, with the actors becom- ing more visible and more predictable through the workings of instruments (an essential factor from the point of view of the state's élites).Policy instruments are not neutral; they condense some form of political power and technique. They have effect of their own but, as for other types of institutions, creative use by various actors produce unintended effects. The instrumentation process reveals political logic and some characteristics of modes of governance. At times, it may be quite central to understand this dimension and one can argue that modes of governance can be trans- formed by technical instruments and their use. The focus on policy instruments and the activities within governance is not the whole story to understand modes of governance but it's a fruitful way to analyse some of it and the implicit power dimension, beyond the goals and the discourses.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTThis chapter owes much to the Policy Instruments and Instrumentation project thatI have run at Sciences Po with Pierre Lascoumes and now Charlotte Halpern. Some of the developments are directly taken from working notes and papers written with Pierre Lascoumes, whom I also thank for his precise analysis of Foucault. I thank Mark Bevir for incisive and constructive comments on the first draft of this chapter.NOTE1 This section develops arguments made by Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004, 2007) and Halpern and Le Galès, 2008).REFERENCESBertelmans-Videc, M.L, Rist, R.C. and Vedung, E. (1998) Carrots, Sticks and Sermons, Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation. New Brunswick, Canada: Transaction Books.Bevir M. (2005) New Labour, A critique: London, Routledge.Bezes, P. (2007) 'Cutting Public Service Wages with a Low-Profile Instrument: A Technical and Genealogical View of the French Policy of Economic Stringency', Governance 20(1).Callon, M. and Latour, B. (1981) 'Unscrewing the Big Leviathan; or How Actors Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them To Do So?', in A. Cicourel (ed.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro and Macro-Sociologies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Commission of the European Communities (2001) European Governance. a White paper, COM 428. Dahl R. and Lindblom C. (1953) Politics, Economics andWelfare. New York: Harper & row.Dehousse, R. (2004) La Méthode Ouverte de Coor-dination, Quand l'Instrument Tient Lieu de Politique', in P. Lascoumes and P. Le Galès (eds), Gouverner par les Instruments. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.Faucher-King, F. and Le Galès, P. (2010) The New Labour Experiment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Favre, Pierre (2005) Comprendre le Monde pour le Changer, Épistémologie du Fait Politique. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 2:

formerly represented by groups. When the audit does not yield satisfactory results, it is rarely the audit itself that is called into ques- tion, but instead the skills of the auditors. The Whole of Society is affected: political Parties, Agencies, Schools, and Associations.
Indicators are Great Performance of Policy Instruments for Government Because they Can Change The indicators relatively easily. On the basis of the British case, even constant modi- fication of instruments can be seen as signifi- cant, in that this obliges the actors to adapt all the time, 'running along behind' instruments that are constantly changing in the name of efficiency. and rationality. This instrumental- ization of the instrumentation considerably increases the degree of control by central élites and marginalizes the issue of aims and objectives even further - or at the very least, euphemizes them. From this Angle, public Policy Instruments As seen May be revealing The behaviors of Actors, The Actors Becom- with Ing more and more predictable Visible Through The workings of Instruments (an Essential factor from The Point of View of The State's Elites).
Policy Instruments are not neutral; they condense some form of political power and technique. They have effect of their own but, as for other types of institutions, creative use by various actors produce unintended effects. The instrumentation process reveals political logic and some characteristics of modes of governance. At times, it may be quite central to understand this dimension and one can argue that modes of governance can be trans- formed by technical instruments and their use. The Focus on Policy Instruments and The activities Within governance is Not The Whole Story to Understand modes of governance but it's a fruitful Way to Analyse some of it and The implicit Power Dimension, Beyond The Goals and The discourses.
AcKnowledgement
This Chapter owes much to The Policy Instruments and Instrumentation project that
I Have Run at Sciences Po with Pierre Lascoumes and now Charlotte Halpern. Some of the developments are directly taken from working notes and papers written with Pierre Lascoumes, whom I also thank for his precise analysis of Foucault. I Thank Mark Bevir for incisive and Constructive comments on The First Draft of this Chapter.
NOTE
1 This Section develops arguments Made by Lascoumes and Le galés (2,004, 2,007) and Halpern and Le galés, 2008).
REFERENCES
Bertelmans-Videc, ML, Rist, RC and Vedung, E. (1998) Carrots, Sticks and Sermons, Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation. New Brunswick, Canada: Transaction Books.
Bevir M. (2005th) New Labour, A critique: London, Routledge.
Bezes, P. (2007) 'Cutting Public Service Wages with a Low-Profile Instrument: A Technical and Genealogical View of The. french Policy of Economic Stringency ', Governance 20 (1).
Callon, M. and Latour, B. (one thousand nine hundred and eighty-one) 'The Big unscrewing Leviathan; or How Actors Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them To Do So? ', in A. Cicourel (ed.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro and Macro-Sociologies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Commission of The European Communities (the 2,001th) European Governance. a White Paper, COM 428. R. Dahl and Lindblom C. (1,953) Politics, Economics and.
Welfare. New York: Harper & Row.
Dehousse, R. (2 004) La Méthode de Coor- Ouverte.
Dination, Quand L'Instrument tient Lieu de Politique ', in P. Lascoumes and P. Le galés (EDS), gouverner par Les Instruments. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Faucher-King, F. and Le galés, P. (2010) The New Labour Experiment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Favre, Pierre (2 005) Comprendre pour le Changer le Monde, Épistémologie Fait du Politique. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 3:

Formerly represented by groups. When the audit does not yield satisfactory results it is, rarely the audit itself that. Is called into ques - tion but instead, the skills of the auditors. The whole of society is affected: political, parties. ,, agencies schools and associations.
.Indicators of performance are great policy instruments for government because they can change the indicators relatively. Easily. On the basis of the British case even constant, modi - fication of instruments can be seen as signifi - cant in that,, This obliges the actors to adapt all the time, 'running along behind' instruments that are constantly changing in the name. Of efficiency and rationality.This instrumental - ization of the instrumentation considerably increases the degree of control by central e ́ lites and. Marginalizes the issue of aims and objectives even further - or at the, very least euphemizes them. From, this angle public. Policy instruments may be seen as revealing the behaviours, of actorsWith the actors becom - ing more visible and more predictable through the workings of instruments (an essential factor. From the point of view of the state 's e ́ lites).
Policy instruments are not neutral; they condense some form of political. Power and technique. They have effect of their, own but as for other types, of institutions creative use by various actors. Produce unintended effects.The instrumentation process reveals political logic and some characteristics of modes of governance. At times it may,, Be quite central to understand this dimension and one can argue that modes of governance can be trans - formed by technical. Instruments and their use.The focus on policy instruments and the activities within governance is not the whole story to understand modes of governance. But it 's a fruitful way to analyse some of it and the implicit power dimension beyond the, goals and the discourses.

, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This Chapter owes much to the Policy Instruments and Instrumentation project that
.I have run at Sciences Po with Pierre Lascoumes and now Charlotte Halpern. Some of the developments are directly taken. From working notes and papers written with, Pierre Lascoumes whom I also thank for his precise analysis of Foucault. I thank. Mark Bevir for incisive and constructive comments on the first draft of this NOTE chapter.

.1 This section develops arguments made by Lascoumes and Le Gale ̀ s (2004 2007), and Halpern and Le Gale, ̀ s 2008). REFERENCES

, Bertelmans-Videc. ,, M.L Rist R.C. And, Vedung E. (1998), and, Carrots Sticks Sermons Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation. New, Brunswick. Canada: Transaction Books.
Bevir M. (2005), New Labour A critique: London Routledge.
Bezes P,,.(2007) 'Cutting Public Service Wages with a Low-Profile Instrument: A Technical and Genealogical View of the French Policy. Of Economic Stringency ', Governance 20 (1).
Callon M. And, Latour B.)', (1981 Unscrewing the Big Leviathan; or How Actors. Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them To Do So? ', in A. Cicourel (ED.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology:Toward an Integration of Micro and Macro-Sociologies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Commission of the European Communities. (2001) European Governance. A, White paper COM 428. Dahl R. And Lindblom C. (1953), Politics Economics and
Welfare. New. York: Harper & row.
, Dehousse R. (2004) La Me ́ thode Ouverte de Coor -
dination Quand L ', Instrument Tient Lieu de Politique',! In P. Lascoumes and P.Le Gale ̀ s (EDS), Gouverner par les Instruments. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Faucher-King F. And, Le Gale, ̀ s P. (2010). The New Labour, Experiment. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
Favre Pierre (2005), Comprendre Le Monde pour, Le Changer. E ́ piste ́ mologie Du Fait Politique. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.