Although petitioner’s claim is one

Although petitioner’s claim is one of due process, the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause figures prominently in his argument. The Clause provides simply that “[n]o State shall … pass any … ex post facto Law.” Art. I, §10, cl. 1. The most well-known and oft-repeated explanation of the scope of the Clause’s protection was given by Justice Chase, who long ago identified, in dictum, four types of laws to which the Clause extends:

“1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798) (seriatim opinion of Chase, J.).

Accord, Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521—525 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41—42, 46 (1990). As the text of the Clause makes clear, it “is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) (citation omitted).

We have observed, however, that limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, we considered the South Carolina Supreme Court’s retroactive application of its construction of the State’s criminal trespass statute to the petitioners in that case. The statute prohibited “entry upon the lands of another … after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry … .” 378 U.S., at 349, n. 1 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The South Carolina court construed the statute to extend to patrons of a drug store who had received no notice prohibiting their entry into the store, but had refused to leave the store when asked. Prior to the court’s decision, South Carolina cases construing the statute had uniformly held that conviction under the statute required proof of notice before entry. None of those cases, moreover, had given the “slightest indication that that requirement could be satisfied by proof of the different act of remaining on the land after being told to leave.” Id., at 357.

We held that the South Carolina court’s retroactive application of its construction to the store patrons violated due process. Reviewing decisions in which we had held criminal statutes “void for vagueness” under the Due Process Clause, we noted that this Court has often recognized the “basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.” Id., at 350; see id., at 350—352 (discussing, inter alia, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), and Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)). Deprivation of the right to fair warning, we continued, can result both from vague statutory language and from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of statutory language that appears narrow and precise on its face. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S., at 352. For that reason, we concluded that “[i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,’ [the construction] must not be given retroactive effect.” Id., at 354 (quoting J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 61 (2d ed. 1960)). We found that the South Carolina court’s construction of the statute violated this principle because it was so clearly at odds with the statute’s plain language and had no support in prior South Carolina decisions. 378 U.S., at 356.

Relying largely upon Bouie, petitioner argues that the Tennessee court erred in rejecting his claim that the retroactive application of its decision to his case violates due process. Petitioner contends that the Ex Post Facto Clause would prohibit the retroactive application of a decision abolishing the year and a day rule if accomplished by the Tennessee Legislature. He claims that the purposes behind the Clause are so fundamental that due process should prevent the Supreme Court of Tennessee from accomplishing the same result by judicial decree. Brief for Petitioner 8—18. In support of this claim, petitioner takes Bouie to stand for the proposition that “[i]n evaluating whether the retroactive application of a judicial decree violates Due Process, a critical question is whether the Constitution would prohibit the same result attained by the exercise of the state’s legislative power.” Brief for Petitioner 12.

To the extent petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause incorporates the specific prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause as identified in Calder, petitioner misreads Bouie. To be sure, our opinion in Bouie does contain some expansive language that is suggestive of the broad interpretation for which petitioner argues. Most prominent is our statement that “[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing … a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.” 378 U.S., at 353—354; see also id., at 353 (“[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law”); id., at 362 (“The Due Process Clause compels the same result” as would the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws “where the State has sought to achieve precisely the same [impermissible] effect by judicial construction of the statute”). This language, however, was dicta. Our decision in Bouie was rooted firmly in well established notions of due process. See supra, at 5. Its rationale rested on core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent conduct. See, e.g., 378 U.S., at 351, 352, 354, 354—355. And we couched its holding squarely in terms of that established due process right, and not in terms of the ex post facto-related dicta to which petitioner points. Id., at 355 (concluding that “the South Carolina Code did not give [the petitioners] fair warning, at the time of their conduct … , that the act for which they now stand convicted was rendered criminal by the statute”). Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion, nowhere in the opinion did we go so far as to incorporate jot-for-jot the specific categories of Calder into due process limitations on the retroactive application of judicial decisions.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 2:

Although petitioner's claim is one of due process, the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause figures prominently in his argument. The Clause provides simply that "[n] o State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law." Art. I, §10, cl. 1. The Most Known and well-OFT-repeated explanation of the scope of the Clause's Protection was given by Justice Chase, Who long ago identified, in dictum, to which the Clause Four types of Laws extends: "1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. "Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight) (Opinion of Seriatim Chase, J.). Accord, Carmell v. Texas, 529 US 513, five hundred and twenty-one to five hundred and twenty-five (two thousandth); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 US 37, 41-42, 46 (1990). As the text of the Clause makes clear, it "is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government." Marks v. United States, 430 US 188, 191 (1977. ) (Citation omitted). We have observed, however, that limitations on ex Post facto are inherent in the notion of Judicial Decisionmaking Due Process. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, we considered the South Carolina Supreme Court's retroactive application of its construction of the State's criminal trespass statute to the petitioners in that case. The statute prohibited "entry upon the lands of another ... after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry ...." 378 US, at 349, n. 1 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The South Carolina court construed the statute to extend to patrons of a drug store who had received no notice prohibiting their entry into the store, but had refused to leave the store when asked. Prior to the court's decision, South Carolina cases construing the statute had uniformly held that conviction under the statute required proof of notice before entry. None of those Cases, Moreover, had given the "Slightest indication that that Requirement could be satisfied by Proof of the different Act of remaining on the Land after being told to leave." Id., At 357. We held that the South Carolina Court's. retroactive application of its construction to the store patrons violated due process. Reviewing decisions in which we had held criminal statutes "void for vagueness" under the Due Process Clause, we noted that this Court has often recognized the "basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.". Id., at 350; see id., at 350-352 (discussing, inter alia, United States v. Harriss, 347 US 612 (1954), Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 US 451 (1939), and Connally v. General Constr. Co.,. 269 ​​US 385 (1926)). Deprivation of the right to fair warning, we continued, can result both from vague statutory language and from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of statutory language that appears narrow and precise on its face. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US, at 352. For that reason, we concluded that "[i] fa judicial construction of a criminal statute is' unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in. issue, '[the construction] must not be given retroactive effect. "Id., at 354 (quoting J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 61 (2d ed. 1960)). We found that the South Carolina court's construction of the statute violated this principle because it was so clearly at odds with the statute's plain language and had no support in prior South Carolina decisions. 378 US, at 356. Relying largely upon Bouie, petitioner argues that the Court erred in rejecting his claim that Tennessee the Application of ITS retroactive to his decision violates Due Process Case. Petitioner contends that the Ex Post Facto Clause would prohibit the retroactive application of a decision abolishing the year and a day rule if accomplished by the Tennessee Legislature. He claims that the purposes behind the Clause are so fundamental that due process should prevent the Supreme Court of Tennessee from accomplishing the same result by judicial decree. Brief for Petitioner 8-18. In support of this claim, petitioner takes Bouie to stand for the proposition that "[i] n evaluating whether the retroactive application of a judicial decree violates Due Process, a critical question is whether the Constitution would prohibit the same result attained by the exercise of. the State's legislative Power. "Brief for petitioner 12. To the extent petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause incorporates the Ex Post Facto Clause specific prohibitions of the As identified in Calder, petitioner misreads Bouie. To be sure, our opinion in Bouie does contain some expansive language that is suggestive of the broad interpretation for which petitioner argues. Most prominent is our statement that "[i] fa state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing ... a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial. construction. "378 US, at 353-354; see also id., at 353 ("[A] n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law"); id., at 362 ("The Due Process Clause compels the same result" as would the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws "where the State has sought to achieve precisely the same [impermissible] effect by judicial construction of the statute"). This language, however, was dicta. Our decision in Bouie was rooted firmly in well established notions of due process. See supra, at 5. Its rationale rested on core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent conduct. See, eg, 378 US, at 351, 352, 354, 354-355. And we couched its holding squarely in terms of that established due process right, and not in terms of the ex post facto-related dicta to which petitioner points. Id., At 355 (concluding that "the South Carolina Code did not give [the petitioners] fair warning, at the time of their conduct ..., that the act for which they now stand convicted was rendered criminal by the statute"). Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, nowhere in the opinion did we go so far as to incorporate jot-for-jot the specific categories of Calder into due process limitations on the retroactive application of judicial decisions.

ผลลัพธ์ (อังกฤษ) 3:

Although petitioner 's claim is one of due process the Constitution', s Ex Post Facto Clause figures prominently in his, argument. The Clause provides simply that "[] o n State shall... Pass any... Ex post facto Law." Art. I:,, 10 cl. 1. The most well-known. And oft-repeated explanation of the scope of the Clause 's protection was given by Justice Chase who long ago identified,,, In, dictumFour types of laws to which the Clause extends:

"1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of, the law. And which was innocent, when done criminal; and punishes such action. 2D. Every law that aggravates a crime or makes, it. Greater than, it was when committed. 3D. Every law that changes, the punishment and inflicts a, greater punishment than. The law annexed to, the crimeWhen committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules, of evidence and receives less or different testimony than,,,, The law required at the time of the Commission of, the offense in order to convict the offender. "Calder v. Bull 3, Dall. 386 390 (, 1798). (seriatim opinion, of Chase J.).

, Accord Carmell v. Texas 529, U.S. 513 521 -, 525 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood 497 U.S. 37,, -, 41 4246 (1990). As the text of the Clause makes clear it ", is a limitation upon the powers of, the Legislature and does not. Of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government. "Marks v. United States 430. 188, U.S, 1977 191 () (Citation. Omitted).

We, have observed however that limitations, on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion. Of due process. In Bouie v.City of Columbia we considered, the South Carolina Supreme Court 's retroactive application of its construction of the State s.' Criminal trespass statute to the petitioners in that case. The statute prohibited "entry upon the lands of another... After. Notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry... "378 U.S, at, 349 n. 1 (Citation and internal quotation marks. Omitted).The South Carolina court construed the statute to extend to patrons of a drug store who had received no notice prohibiting. Their entry into the store but had, refused to leave the store when asked. Prior to the court ', s decision South Carolina. Cases construing the statute had uniformly held that conviction under the statute required proof of notice before, entry. None of those cases moreover,,Had given the "slightest indication that that requirement could be satisfied by proof of the different act of remaining. On the land after being told to leave. "Id, at 357.

We held that the South Carolina court s retroactive application of. ' Its construction to the store patrons violated due process.Reviewing decisions in which we had held criminal statutes "void for vagueness." under the Due Process Clause we noted,, That this Court has often recognized the "basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct. That it makes a crime. "Id, at 350; see ID, at 350 - 352 (discussing inter Alia, United States, v. Harriss 347, U.S. 612 (1954),. Lanzetta V, New Jersey.306 U.S. 451 (1939), and Connally v. General Constr. Co, 269 U.S. 385 (1926)). Deprivation of the right to, fair warning. We continued can result, both from vague statutory language and from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion. Of statutory language that appears narrow and precise on its face. Bouie v. City, of Columbia 378 U.S, at 352. For that. Reason.We concluded that "[] f I a judicial construction of a criminal statute is' unexpected and indefensible by reference to the. Law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue '[], the construction must not be given retroactive effect. "Id.,. At 354 (quoting J. Hall General Principles, of Criminal Law 61 (2D ed. 1960)).We found that the South Carolina court 's construction of the statute violated this principle because it was so clearly. At odds with the statute 's plain language and had no support in prior South Carolina decisions. 378 U.S, at 356.

Relying. Largely, upon BouiePetitioner argues that the Tennessee court erred in rejecting his claim that the retroactive application of its decision. To his case violates due process. Petitioner contends that the Ex Post Facto Clause would prohibit the retroactive application. Of a decision abolishing the year and a day rule if accomplished by the Tennessee Legislature.He claims that the purposes behind the Clause are so fundamental that due process should prevent the Supreme Court of Tennessee. From accomplishing the same result by judicial decree. Brief for Petitioner 8 - 18. In support of this claim petitioner takes,, Bouie to stand for the proposition that "[] n I evaluating whether the retroactive application of a judicial decree violates. Due, ProcessA critical question is whether the Constitution would prohibit the same result attained by the exercise of the state s. ' Legislative power. "Brief for Petitioner 12.

To the extent petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause incorporates. The specific prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause as identified in Calder petitioner misreads, Bouie To, be sure.Our opinion in Bouie does contain some expansive language that is suggestive of the broad interpretation for which petitioner. Argues. Most prominent is our statement that "[] f I a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing. Law a,...It must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result. By judicial construction. "378 U.S, at 353 - 354; see also ID, at 353 (" [] n A unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal. ,, statute applied retroactively operates precisely like an ex post facto law, ID. ");