In thisstudy,weinvestigatedthediscretionarynatureofthecorporateR&Ddisclosuredecision.Ourargumentsfocuson managers'discretiontodecidewhichexpensesareclassifiedasR&Dratherthanasothertypesofexpenses.ReportedR&D representsaninternalallocationofoutlaysforlaborandequipmentthathasthesameinfluenceonaccountingprofitas otherpre-taxexpensesofthefirm.USGAAPprovidesdetailedguidelinesforclassifyingexpensesasR&D,butthese guidelines stillrequiremanagerialdiscretion,suggestingthepotentialforadisclosurebiasinreportedcorporateR&D.In addition toexpense-shiftingtechniquestoprovidebiasedR&Ddisclosures,firmscanalsousevariousorganizational structures,suchasjointventures,tocreateR&Dopacity. TotestifmissingR&DindicatesthatfirmsdonotengageininnovationandR&D-typeactivity,wecollectedabroad sample offirmsandusedpatentactivitytotestthediscretionarynatureoftheR&Dreportingdecision.First,wecompared patentactivitybetweenfirmsthatreportzeroR&DandthosethatfailedtoreportanyinformationoncorporateR&D (typicallyassumedtohavezeroR&D).Inaseriesofunivariateandmultivariatetestsweconsistentlyfoundthatthenon- reportingR&Dfirmsfileover14timesasmanypatentsasfirmsthatreportzeroR&Dexpenditure.Moreover,wediscovered that thesenon-reportingfirmsobtainedpatentswithbroadercontributionsandgreatercitationbreadththanzeroR&D firms. Alltold,thefirstsetoftestsuncoverthatover10%oftheCompustatuniverseofmissingR&
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